YOUNG ADULTS AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY
Amber Venturelli*
INTRODUCTION
Deeply rooted in American history is the understanding that children are
different. Transcending cultural, social, and legal norms, attitudes about kids
have been largely consistent across time. Long before criminologists and
legal scholars could point to neuroscientific evidence or behavioral studies to
explain why children are different, society generally believed children
deserved a second chance and that they could be “saved” from a life of crime.
As research developed in the twentieth century, commonsense explanations
of juvenile criminal responsibility that underpinned juvenile justice in
America were largely substantiated by groundbreaking behavioral and
developmental science. While these studies clearly influenced public
opinion, they also prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to establish procedural
and substantive rules for juvenile adjudications and sentencings. The
findings of these studies not only confirmed existing views on juvenile
culpability, but further research also revealed that young adults are more
similarly situated to juveniles than adults when weighing criminal
responsibility.1
This Comment will consider whether the growing
scholarship on the culpability of young adults should influence how courts
and society blame and punish persons that commit crimes while between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-four. This Comment makes the assumption that
“desert based on moral fault is at least a necessary pre-condition for just
punishment.”2 That is, whether a young adult is punished like a juvenile or
an adult is, in part, dependent on his or her moral blameworthiness. This
*
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Throughout this Comment, young adults will refer to persons between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-four. The terms minor, juvenile, youth, adolescents, adolescence, kid, child, or children will
refer to persons under the age of eighteen.
Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 16 (1997).
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Comment explores the evidence that indicates that young adults are more
similarly situated to juveniles than adults with regard to their moral
blameworthiness and how, if it all, this will impact criminal punishment for
young adults.
Part I will provide a comprehensive overview on the history of juvenile
justice in order to provide context on the philosophical attitudes and
jurisprudence over time. Part II will examine findings from scientific
research on the blameworthiness of juveniles and young adults. This section
will also consider the scientific evidence cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in
its recent decisions on juvenile culpability. Part III will evaluate possible
responses to addressing the diminished criminal culpability of young adults.
Specifically, this section reviews young adult court, a problem-solving court
that is gaining popularity across the United States, and constitutional
arguments that seek to extend juvenile sentencing philosophies to young
adults. This Comment will argue that, despite the neurological and
behavioral similarities between young adults and juveniles, the courts will not
interfere in any meaningful way to change the relationship between young
adults and the criminal justice system because young adults do not invoke the
same deep-rooted historical attitudes that exist towards juveniles.
I.

HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

Society’s differential treatment of children has persisted throughout
American history. For “as far back as written records go,” criminal
culpability has been attributed differently to juveniles and adults.3 Indeed,
adults have always been treated differently from juveniles under criminal law
and punishment. As studies continue to find that young adults and juveniles
are similarly situated, it begs the question of whether young adults should
also be treated differently.4 To properly answer this question, it is critical to
review the history of juvenile justice. This history reveals that although there
have been minor shifts over time regarding the blame and punishment of
juveniles, the Supreme Court, as well as society, has been largely consistent
in differentiating juveniles from adults in the legal system.
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Kevin Lapp, Young Adults & Criminal Jurisdiction, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 357, 357 (2019) (citation
omitted); see also ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
28 (2008) (“Philosophers and educators have recognized for centuries that there is a distinctive stage
of life between childhood and adulthood . . . .”).
See Lapp, supra note 3, at 359 (noting that “cultural, biological, and legal developments” regarding
young adults “undermine . . . the binary structure of criminal justice administration”).
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A. Origins
Despite the longstanding belief that juveniles and adults are different,
there was not always a system that could adequately respond to these
differences. As a result, prior to the early nineteenth century, juvenile
offenders were punished and confined in prison alongside adults.5 At that
time, the common law relied solely on age to determine whether a child was
capable of committing a crime. Under the common law, children younger
than the age of seven had no criminal capacity, children between the ages of
seven and fourteen had a rebuttable presumption that they had no criminal
capacity, and children ages fourteen and older had the same criminal
capacity as adults.6 In effect, once a child turned seven years old, it was
possible for him or her to be arrested, tried, and punished like an adult, and
it was certain once a child turned fourteen years old.7 Early reformers
rejected this treatment of children and argued that society had a duty to
rehabilitate juveniles, not just judge their culpability and punish their
actions.8
1. Houses of Refuge
As early as 1815, reformers publicly denounced housing juvenile
offenders with adults in prison and called attention to the “contamination of
innocence as one of the major evils that had resulted” from mixing
impressionable children with dangerous criminals.9 This outrage garnered
public attention and led New York state to enact a law that granted the
Society for the Prevention of Pauperism with the authority to establish a
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Juvenile Justice History, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., http://www.cjcj.org/Education1/JuvenileJustice-History.html [https://perma.cc/GWW2-NPEU] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020); see also Sanford
J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1970) (stating
that juveniles were housed with adults in prison).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6(a) (3d ed. 2019); see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (“[C]hildren under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal
intent.”).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17; see also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106
(1909) (“Our common criminal law did not differentiate between the adult, and the minor who had
reached the age of criminal responsibility, seven at common law . . . .”).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15–16.
Fox, supra note 5, at 1189; see also ROBERT S. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE
REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815–1857, at 21 (1969) (stating that the movement to create a
refuge for juvenile offenders began in 1815).
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reformatory.10 Subsequently, in 1825, the New York House of Refuge
established the first juvenile reformatory in the United States.11 The House
of Refuge housed youth that authorities had deemed to be on a path towards
delinquency and sought to segregate juveniles from corrupting influences
because the early reformers believed that juveniles could be “saved” from a
life of future criminal conduct.12 The founders of the House of Refuge
believed that poor and destitute children were destined for a life of poverty
and primarily blamed the children’s “morally inferior parents” as
justification for their moral crusade.13 This crusade was framed as a “benign
intervention” for the sake of protecting the public good.14 To “save” these
children, the House of Refuge adopted a penitentiary model that valued
isolation and penitence.15 This model gained popularity and, within twenty
years, about twenty-five similar institutions were established throughout the
country.16
American courts validated this confinement under the doctrine of parens
patriae.17 In the landmark decision, Ex parte Crouse, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the legality of the Philadelphia House of Refuge
penitentiary scheme.18 In Crouse, Mary Ann Crouse was committed to the
Philadelphia House of Refuge by a justice of the peace, who relied on
allegations from her mother that Mary Ann could not be controlled due to
her “vicious conduct.”19 Mary Ann’s father sought a writ of habeas corpus
against the Philadelphia House of Refuge and demanded the release of his
daughter from its custody.20 The court rejected the habeas petition, holding
that the Philadelphia House of Refuge was a school, not a prison.21 For the
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PICKETT, supra note 9, at 21–49; see also N.Y. STATE ARCHIVES, THE GREATEST REFORM
SCHOOL IN THE WORLD: A GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF THE NEW YORK HOUSE OF REFUGE 4
(1989),
http://www.archives.nysed.gov/common/archives/files/res_topics_ed_reform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26J5-CWEM] [hereinafter THE GREATEST REFORM SCHOOL IN THE
WORLD] (noting that the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism was instrumental in the creation
of the New York House of Refuge).
THE GREATEST REFORM SCHOOL IN THE WORLD, supra note 10, at 4.
Fox, supra note 5, at 1190–91.
Daniel Macallair, The San Francisco Industrial School and the Origins of Juvenile Justice in California: A Glance
at the Great Reformation, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2003).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Juvenile Justice History, supra note 5.
Fox, supra note 5, at 1206–07. For further discussion on parens patriae, see infra Section I.A.2.
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); see also Fox, supra note 5, at 1205 (stating that Ex parte
Crouse was the first reported case to uphold the House of Refuge scheme).
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. at 9–10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
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first time in American jurisprudence, a court invoked the doctrine of parens
patriae for juvenile detention and reasoned that “the public has a paramount
interest in the virtue and knowledge of its members, and . . . the business of
education belongs to [the public].”22 Through recognizing the Philadelphia
House of Refuge as a reformatory with morally and socially acceptable
purposes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Mary Ann
Crouse’s confinement was not only lawful, but also that it would be “an act
of extreme cruelty to release her.”23 This historic decision laid the foundation
of parens patriae and became the leading authority for states to commit
children based on future predictions of delinquency.24
By the mid-nineteenth century, scandals and investigations surrounding
the houses of refuge had plagued the penitentiary model—the most notable
example being the San Francisco Industrial School.25 The gold rush to
California was “one of the greatest peacetime migrations in history” and
included large numbers of vagrant and destitute children, especially in San
Francisco.26 This rapid population increase prompted city leaders to
advocate for social order.27 In 1858, the legislature passed the Industrial
School Act, which was modeled after the New York House of Refuge. 28 The
Industrial School Act marked the establishment of the first institution for
delinquent youths on the West Coast.29 When the school opened in 1859,
there was “great optimism and fanfare.”30 The vast majority of students sent
to the school had only committed the non-criminal offense of leading an idle
and dissolute life.31 Since children sent to the school were considered to be
lacking in moral and spiritual virtue, the school emphasized hard work and
rigorous instruction because these activities were believed to be the only way
to reverse the juvenile’s behavior.32
The harsh reality that existed in the San Francisco Industrial School was
ultimately uncovered in the late 1860s when allegations of staff brutality
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Id.
Id. at 12; see also Macallair, supra note 13, at 57–60 (explaining that the houses of refuge and
industrial schools reflected a belief that valued institutional segregation of children and allowed the
courts to exercise absolute control over youth).
Fox, supra note 5, at 1207.
Macallair, supra note 13, at 8, 10.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18–19.
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prompted two grand jury investigations.33 The grand juries documented
numerous cases of close confinement, beatings, floggings, gagging, diets
consisting only of bread and water, and deprivation of sunlight.34 In some
instances, the staff’s treatment was so severe that juveniles were driven to
suicide.35 The female inmates were also subject to repeated sexual abuse.36
The findings of the grand jury investigations sparked public outrage.37
Although the School attempted to reorganize its structure to restore public
confidence, the School continued to be plagued with mismanagement and
scandal.38 In 1892, after thirty-three years, the San Francisco Industrial
School was ordered to be closed.39 Like the San Francisco Industrial School,
similar institutions faced the same reality, which led to their ultimate
dissolution.40 This period reflects one attempt at establishing an institution
that valued rehabilitative goals for juveniles.
2. Early Juvenile Court System and Parens Patriae
The nineteenth century saw significant changes in both the philosophical
attitudes towards delinquent juveniles and the institutional structures that
sought to address that delinquency. The rise and fall of the houses of refuge
bestowed important lessons on the treatment of juveniles and largely
contributed to some of the substantive goals that materialized in the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act of 1899 (“1899 Act”).41 The 1899 Act is credited with
establishing the first juvenile court in the United States.42 Remnant policies
of the houses of refuge like coercive predictions, an emphasis on family life,
and a child-saving philosophy were endorsed by the 1899 Act.43
However, the 1899 Act also made groundbreaking changes to the
adjudication of juveniles and led to the advancement of the juvenile court
system throughout the country. One of the most important features of the
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Id. at 26.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
See Fox, supra note 5, at 1222 (reasoning that the 1899 Act implemented some of the same goals as
the House of Refuge).
Marsha Levick, Jessica Feierman, Sharon Messenheimer Kelley, Naomi E. S. Goldstein & Kacey
Mordecai, The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of
Childhood and Adolescence, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 286 (2012).
Fox, supra note 5, at 1222.
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1899 Act was the establishment of a separate court for cases involving persons
under sixteen years old who were alleged to be dependent, neglected, or
delinquent.44 Other features of the 1899 Act included creating special
procedures for juveniles, prohibiting the detention of children under the age
of twelve in a jail or police station, requiring the separation of juveniles and
adults when housed in the same institution, and providing for probation
officers to investigate and supervise juveniles on probation.45 The 1899 Act
also sought to improve the institutions that housed delinquent juveniles,
move towards a more privatized enterprise, and maintain religious
segregation.46
Soon after 1899 Act was passed, states began replicating the legislation
and establishing a juvenile court system in their own jurisdictions.47 The
juvenile court system promoted differential treatment for delinquent children
because the court was to serve a fundamentally different mission than the
adult criminal justice system.48 The adult criminal justice system is largely
based on the assumption that people possess free will and can voluntarily
choose their actions.49 This assumption is based on the premise that
autonomy and freedom are essential to criminal responsibility.50 Since the
adult criminal justice system presumes that people can freely choose whether
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PATRICIA YEOMANS SALVADOR, OHIO JUVENILE LAW § 1:2 (2020).
Id.
See Fox, supra note 5, at 1222–29 (reviewing the existing goals and the new goals that contributed
to the 1899 Act).
Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT.
REV. 167, 169; see also SALVADOR, supra note 44, at § 1:2 (“By 1925 every state but two had a
juvenile court.”).
Paulsen, supra note 47, at 170.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2545, 2547 (2007) [hereinafter Morse, Criminal Responsibility] (“It is a commonplace that the
assumption of free will is foundational for our criminal law responsibility doctrines and practices.”).
Free will has various interpretations and it is often confused within the context of legal outcomes.
Generally, free will assumes “human beings possess the ability or power to act uncaused by anything
other than themselves.” Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges
to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 3 (2008) [hereinafter Morse,
Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology]. That particular formulation of free will is typically
referred to as libertarian freedom or contra-causal freedom. Whether human beings actually have
free will poses significant philosophical questions regarding blame and punishment. However, free
will is not currently a condition in any doctrine of criminal law and it should not be understood as
necessary for criminal responsibility. Id. at 3–4.
See Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology, supra note 49, at 13 (“[Many people] believe
that [criminal] responsibility is only possible if we genuinely possess contra-causal freedom.”). But
see Morse, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 49, at 2552–53 (arguing that libertarian freedom is not
essential to criminal responsibility and “all doctrines of criminal law are fully compatible or
consistent with the truth of determinism or causation”).
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to engage in criminal acts, punishments are designed to guide their behavior
and influence their decision-making.51 Retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation are considered the four primary functions
of criminal punishment.52 To briefly summarize each function:
The principle of retribution aims to give violators of the law their “just
deserts” such that punishment provides a harmful response to a wrongful
act. The principle of deterrence, on the other hand, is forward-looking and
attempts to influence an offender’s decision-making with the threat of
punishment. . . . The principles of incapacitation and rehabilitation are also
forward-looking. Incapacitation also aims to stop defendants from
offending, but there is no attempt to influence decision-making; instead the
offender’s environment is manipulated to make reoffending impossible,
typically via incarceration. Rehabilitation is the practice of attempting to
reform offenders so that they will not reoffend.53

Conversely, the reformers of juvenile justice rejected deterrence and
retribution as appropriate functions of punishment for delinquent juveniles.
These reformers argued that children, unlike adults, do not possess the kind
of free will that is necessary for criminal responsibility.54 Meaning, juveniles
do not choose to engage in criminal activity in the same way that adults do.
The reformers instead blamed society as the primary cause of juvenile
crime.55 Accordingly, the juvenile justice system and adult criminal justice
system promote different goals in light of these perceived differences. While
the adult criminal justice system aims to impose “stigma and pain for the
purposes of punishment, deterrence, or reformation[,] [t]he aims of the new
juvenile [court are] protection, education, and salvation.”56 Juvenile courts
looked to answer the question of “why did this child do it” and not “did this
child do it?”57 In answering broader behavioral questions, the juvenile court
purports to act in the best interest of the child, so it is believed that the child
does not need any adversarial protections.58 As a result, trials by jury were
prohibited, rules of evidence were not strictly followed, juveniles were not
represented by lawyers, and hearings were private and informal.59

51
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WILLIAM HIRSTEIN, KATRINA L. SIFFERD & TYLER K. FAGAN, RESPONSIBLE BRAINS:
NEUROSCIENCE, LAW, AND HUMAN CULPABILITY 210 (2018).
Id.
Id.
Paulsen, supra note 47, at 169.
Id.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 171.
Id.
See id. at 170–71 (discussing the procedural limitations of juvenile courts).

1150

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:5

Juvenile court proceedings were initially able to avoid constitutional
requirements by relying on parens patriae, a well-established common law
principle from the courts of equity in England.60 Parens patriae translates
literally to “parent of the country” and is commonly understood to refer to
the role of the state as a guardian to juveniles.61 The theory of parens patriae
rests on three premises. First, children must be supervised because childhood
is a period of risk and dependency.62 Second, while a child’s family is the
primary supervisor, the state plays a leading role in a child’s education and
must “intervene forcefully whenever the family setting fails to provide
adequate nurture, moral training, or supervision.”63 Third, a public official
is the appropriate authority in determining what is in a child’s best interests.64
As previously discussed, in 1839, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the
first American court to invoke the doctrine of parens patriae to rationalize its
role in upholding the commitment of a juvenile in the Philadelphia House of
Refuge.65 Over one hundred years later, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the role of juvenile courts as parens patriae in Kent v. United States.66 In Kent,
the Court held that the state as parens patriae had an interest in providing
“guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society.”67
Traditionally under parens patriae, juveniles exchange their constitutionally
protected rights for the court to act in their best interest.68 Since the court is
acting in the best interest of the child, there is no reason for adversarial
procedures or due process protections.69 Accordingly, during the nineteenth
60
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In 1922, the U.S. Children’s Bureau published a monograph, which reported on the legal questions
raised by juvenile courts. In this publication, the Children’s Bureau differentiated juvenile courts
from other courts based on the English “conception that the State owes a duty of protection to
children” and that “children have been regarded as wards of chancery [and] [t]he crown was parens
patriae.” BERNARD FLENXER & REUBEN OPPENHEIMER, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 5, 7 (1922). However, under English
common law, parens patriae was only used to protect children from adults regarding their property
rights or to ensure that they had a proper upbringing. Parens patriae was never invoked to protect
children from the consequences of their criminal conduct. Thus, the invocation of parens patriae
in the United States during the twentieth century for juvenile courts was arguably a misapplication
of the doctrine. Paulsen, supra note 47, at 172–73.
Claudia Worrell, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection Masked by the Parens Patriae
Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 176 n.8 (1985).
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 3–4 (2d ed. 2019).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Ex
parte Crouse, which invoked parens patriae).
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1966).
Id. at 554.
Worrell, supra note 61, at 176.
Id.
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and early-twentieth centuries, society widely supported treating delinquent
juveniles differently than adults and the courts continued to uphold
differential treatment through the invocation of parens patriae.
B. Juveniles Begin Receiving the Same Treatment as Adults
The early reformers of the juvenile justice system did not anticipate the
constitutional protections required in adult proceedings ever infiltrating the
juvenile court room.70 However, the lack of procedure in juvenile
proceedings became subject to criticism as the inequities became more
apparent.71 As described by the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States,
“[t]here is evidence . . . that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that
he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”72
With increasing
resentment and criticism towards the juvenile court system, the
transformative Supreme Court decision in In re Gault was not surprising.73
Labeling the juvenile court system as “peculiar,” the Court forcefully pushed
back against the patriarchal system and condemned its arbitrariness.74
Pointing to high rates of recidivism among juveniles, the Court suggested that
the classic premises for informality within the juvenile court lacked merit.75
The Court also relied on studies which found that a juvenile will likely resist
the rehabilitative aims of juvenile court when due process is not afforded to

70

71

72
73

74
75

Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804 (2003); see also In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (“The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and
penalties . . . .”).
See John Holland, A Look Back at the Juvenile Justice System Before There Was Gault, JUV. JUST. INFO.
EXCHANGE (May 15, 2017), https://jjie.org/2017/05/15/a-look-back-at-the-juvenile-justicesystem-before-there-was-gault/ [https://perma.cc/AXK7-4756] (“By the time Gault reached the
Supreme Court, the notion of a patriarchal state juvenile justice system was already eroding.”);
Orman W. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DELINQ. 97, 109 (1961)
(calling for reform in juvenile courts and emphasizing the importance of due process and fair
treatment of children); Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in A Discretionary Regime: Punishment and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1995) (noting that “rights
theorists and child advocates have focused on the struggle between unbridled discretion and
rational procedure” in juvenile courts).
Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, the Court grappled with similar questions
of procedure for juveniles and indicated that unbridled discretion and unchecked punishments in
juvenile courts were unfair. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (1948) (considering whether
a confession from a fifteen-year-old was constitutional). In addition, courts in other jurisdictions
were also considering whether states could abandon due process in juvenile courts. See Holland,
supra note 71.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17–18.
Id. at 22.
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him or her because the child feels deceived or enticed.76 Famously, the Court
concluded: “Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy [or girl]
does not justify a kangaroo court.”77
The obvious tension between an informal court and the need for some
protections led to the formalization of juvenile court procedures. While
juveniles do not enjoy all of the procedural protections available to adults,78
juveniles now have numerous constitutional safeguards. These protections
include notice,79 right to counsel,80 right against self-incrimination,81 right to
cross-examination,82 right to a hearing,83 a statement of reasons for a decision
to transfer a juvenile to adult court,84 proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard,85 and protection against double jeopardy.86 The Supreme Court
has been careful not to superimpose the “formalities of the criminal
adjudicative process” on the juvenile court system because doing so would
negate the purpose of having two distinct systems.87
The constitutional protections afforded to juveniles by the Court came at
significant costs. A more formal juvenile court legitimized harsher
punishments for children.88 Beginning in the 1950s, a new wave of legal
76

77
78
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81

82
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84
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87
88

Id. at 26; see also id. (citing recent studies that suggested with unanimity “that the appearance as well
as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness . . . may be a more impressive and more
therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned”).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 (1984) (holding that the threshold finding for pretrial
detention of accused juvenile delinquents is less strict); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
545 (1971) (denying the right to a jury trial for juveniles); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 32 (limiting due
process requirements to juvenile court adjudications of delinquency).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33 (“Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given
sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so . . . the child and his parents or guardian
be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing
. . . .”).
Id. at 36 (holding a juvenile has a right to the assistance of counsel when his punishment is
comparable to felony prosecution).
Id. at 49 (“[I]t is also clear that the availability of the privilege [against self-incrimination] does not
turn on the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the
statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.”).
Id. at 57.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
Id.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as
are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault . . . .”).
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
Barry C. Feld, Punishing Kids in Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 47 CRIME & JUST. 417, 424 (2018); see
also GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL
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scholars claimed that the rehabilitative goals of juvenile courts were
ineffective and overstated.89 Meanwhile, in the 1980s and early 1990s, there
was an increase in violent juvenile crime, which incited concerns about
public safety.90 Later research has found that the concerns over public safety,
while somewhat justified, were overblown91 and had features of a moral
panic.92 For example, much of the legislation that intended to “get tough”
on juvenile crime in response to the public’s moral panic was enacted after
violent juvenile crime rates began to decline.93 Nonetheless, the culmination
of the public’s moral panic and the criticism of the juvenile court philosophy
gave rise to a reexamination of the juvenile justice system as well as
campaigns to transfer juvenile cases from juvenile court to adult criminal
court.94
Transfer (or waiver) laws are the mechanisms used to transfer the
jurisdiction over a juvenile’s case from the juvenile court system to the adult
criminal court system.95 Transfer laws typically fall within three primary
categories: (1) judicial waiver, (2) prosecutorial waiver, or (3) statutory
exclusion.96 Currently, each state uses at least one of these transfer
strategies.97 Judicial waiver, the most common transfer strategy,98 is the
process in which “a juvenile court judge decides whether there is probable
cause to believe a juvenile respondent committed a serious offense and, if so,
whether the interest of the community would be served by the prosecution

89

90

91
92

93
94
95
96
97
98

RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2018) (“In the last decades of the twentieth century, there was a move towards
increasingly punitive policies towards child criminals in the United States[.]”).
David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 13, 29 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 70, at 806; see also Tanenhaus, supra note 89, at 29 (“After World War
II, public fears about a juvenile crime wave, fueled by the statistics punished in the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reports . . . focused attention on the state of American youth.”) (citation omitted).
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 70, at 807.
See id. (“The elements of a moral panic include an intense community concern . . . that is focused
on deviant behavior, an exaggerated perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of
offenders, and collective hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders threatening
the community.”).
Id. at 808. However, see id. at 807–11 for a discussion on racial and ethnic biases driving hostility
towards juvenile delinquents.
Tanenhaus, supra note 89, at 33.
Feld, supra note 88, at 451; see also NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., Transfer, https://njdc.info/transfer/
[https://perma.cc/E53F-UGC9] (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
Ross, supra note 71, at 1042 n.29.
Feld, supra note 88, at 451.
Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT 83, 84 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
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of that offense in criminal court rather than juvenile court.”99 Under
prosecutorial waiver, juvenile and adult criminal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over certain proscribed ages and offenses and prosecutors choose
which court to prosecute the charges.100 Statutory exclusion involves the
legislature defining the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to exclude juveniles from
juvenile court based on their age and offense.101
The implementation of transfer laws has sparked criticism from
advocates of the juvenile court system because the criminal court philosophy
is inherently different from the philosophy of the juvenile court.102 After the
introduction of procedural safeguards in the juvenile court system, one of the
few remaining differences between juvenile courts and adult criminal courts
is the sentencing philosophies applied after adjudication. Since the
widespread utilization of transfer, the focus on rehabilitation at sentencing
has vanished for many juveniles.103 In fact, juveniles transferred to adult
court have an increased likelihood of incarceration and longer sentences
when compared to juveniles that were not transferred and remained in
juvenile court.104 Prompted by subtle changes in public attitudes, the
practice of transferring juvenile offenders to adult criminal court marks one
instance where society has overlooked longstanding views of juvenile
culpability in order to embrace a more punitive philosophy.
Blended sentencing is another measure that advances a punitive
approach to juvenile crime. Blended sentencing laws allow judges in juvenile
courts to impose adult sentences or extend their sentencing jurisdiction over
the juvenile into early adulthood.105 In other words, by providing juvenile
court judges with juvenile and criminal sentencing options, the judge may:
“(1) impose a juvenile or an adult sentence, (2) impose both a juvenile and
adult sentence, with the adult sentence suspended under conditions, or (3)

99

100
101
102
103
104
105

Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 45, 45 (Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
Feld, supra note 98, at 85.
Id.
See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text (explaining the differences between the philosophies
of the adult criminal court and juvenile court).
See Feld, supra note 98, at 85 (“Both offense exclusion and direct-file approaches deemphasize
rehabilitation and individualized consideration of the offender . . . .”).
Feld, supra note 88, at 453.
Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in America, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 145, 145 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
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impose a sentence past the normal limit of juvenile court jurisdiction.”106
Blended sentencing laws were created in response to public criticism that the
traditional punishments imposed by juvenile courts did not effectively deter
juveniles from seriously reoffending.107 In effect, blended sentences have a
net-widening effect by extending the reach of adult punishments in juvenile
courts, which ultimately undermines the philosophy of juvenile courts and
ignores the differences between kids and adults.108
Initiatives like transfer laws and blended sentencing have vastly changed
juveniles’ interactions with the criminal justice system. Fueled by a moral
panic and political incentives, the aims of the juvenile court once strongly
accepted by the public were partially abandoned by the 1980s and 1990s.
C. Judicial Intervention: Reestablishing that Kids Are Different
While pundits continued to stoke public outrage on juvenile crime and
the juvenile court system, the Supreme Court was hinting at its resistance
towards a regime that totally ignored the differences between children and
adults. The Supreme Court’s recognition of procedural rights for juveniles
was not meant to “spell the doom of the juvenile court system.”109 Even in
affording numerous constitutional rights to juveniles in In re Gault, the Court
acknowledged that the juvenile justice system has value because it is
“operated by people who are better educated and more highly skilled, can
call on more and better facilities and services, and has more ancillary
agencies to which to refer its clientele than its adult counterpart.”110 Those
aspects of the juvenile justice system did not emerge accidently; they were the
product of the early reformers’ efforts to design a system that could effectively
address juvenile delinquency. The Supreme Court’s prior criticism of the
juvenile court structure was not meant to be an indictment on the philosophy
of juvenile justice.
The Supreme Court has maintained that the age of a criminal defendant
has meaning. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s
mental and emotional development could be considered as a mitigating
factor during sentencing.111 The Court recognized that “youth is more than
a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 167.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 534 (1971).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18–9 n.23 (1967) (citation omitted).
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).

1156

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:5

most susceptible to influence and psychological damage.”112 As primary
support for this claim, the Court observed: “Our history is replete with laws
and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are less mature and responsible than adults.”113 The Court also
cited behavioral studies on adolescence to further support its claim.114 This
was one of the first Supreme Court decisions to reiterate the diminished
culpability of juveniles since the Court’s prior efforts to liken juvenile courts
to adult criminal courts.
About six years later in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court rejected
capital punishment for children under sixteen years old at the time of the
crime.115 Like the Court’s rationale in Eddings, the plurality opinion in
Thompson acknowledged the diminished culpability of juveniles. Specifically,
the plurality reasoned that juveniles are inexperienced, less educated, and
less intelligent and, therefore, less able to weigh the consequences of their
conduct and more likely to be motivated by emotion or peer pressure than
adults.116 These characteristics, the plurality concluded, support the finding
that juveniles are less culpable than adults.117 Moreover, the plurality stated
that juvenile’s diminished culpability makes retribution an inappropriate
justification for capital punishment and the “virtually nonexistent” likelihood
that an offender engages in any cost-benefit analysis regarding execution
makes deterrence also an ineffective justification.118
The following year in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court declined to
extend the holding in Thompson to juveniles facing the death penalty for
offenses committed while they were either sixteen or seventeen years old.119
However, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Stanford pointedly identifies how the
majority missed the mark on why minors should be treated differently than
adults and explained that the differential treatment between minors and
adults “reflects the simple truth derived from communal experiences that
juveniles as a class have not the level of maturation and responsibility that we
presume in adults and consider desirable for full participation in the rights
and duties of modern life.”120 Although the Supreme Court had previously

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id. at 115.
Id.at 115–16.
Id. at 115 n.11 (citations omitted).
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 837.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
Id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cited behavioral research in its opinions, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Stanford
brought this research to the forefront of his discussion.121 Justice Brennan’s
dissent arguably helped shape how the Court would consider scientific
evidence in future juvenile cases.122
Over ten years later and with four new justices on the bench, the
Supreme Court changed course and effectively overruled its previous holding
in Stanford.123 Justice Kennedy, who voted with the majority in Stanford, now
penned the majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons.124 In Roper, the Supreme
Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on all juvenile offenders
is now unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.125 Justice Kennedy
first concluded that the objective indicia of society’s standards had changed
since the Court’s decision in Stanford.126 Justice Kennedy then established
that there are three general differences between juveniles and adults: (1)
juveniles lack maturity, (2) juveniles are more vulnerable to negative
influences and outside pressures, and (3) juveniles’ character is not as well
formed as adults’ character.127 Unlike the majority in Stanford, Justice
Kennedy focused primarily on scientific studies to support these
differences.128 However, Justice Kennedy did not only rely on science—he
also famously recognized that these differences embody what “any parent
knows” about children.129 Nonetheless, with behavioral and social science
studies grounding Justice Kennedy’s analysis, the Supreme Court was
reshaping how juvenile offenders should be considered under the
Constitution and re-invoking the paternalistic philosophy that created
juvenile courts.130
121
122

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

See id. at 394–96 (considering the behavioral evidence that justifies differential treatment for
juveniles).
See Note, The Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American Prisons, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1250, 1256 n.44 (2015) (noting that the majority in Stanford refused to consider scientific
evidence of culpability whereas the dissenting justices would have considered it); see also Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–74 (2005) (relying largely on scientific evidence to guide its analysis
on juvenile culpability).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 574; see also infra Section III.B.1 (discussing Eighth Amendment doctrine).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
Id. at 569–70. For a more detailed account of the differences between juveniles and adults
articulated by Justice Kennedy in Roper, see Section II.A.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
Id. at 569.
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 MINN.
J.L. & INEQ. 535, 543 (2013) (“Paternalistic attitudes about children were submerged in the 1990s,
but they are deeply embedded in our culture, and with the reduced focus on the threat of juvenile
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The Supreme Court did not stop at its decision in Roper. Five years later
in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that a life without the possibility of parole
(“LWOP”) sentence for juveniles convicted of a non-homicidal offense is also
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.131 For the first time, the
majority opinion—again delivered by Justice Kennedy—referenced “brain
science” in its rationale.132 In discussing the diminished culpability of
juveniles, Justice Kennedy first repeated the three general differences
between juveniles and adults articulated in Roper.133 Justice Kennedy then
went on to explain that those differences should not be reconsidered because
no new data has suggested any reason to doubt the validity of those
differences.134
To bolster this point, Justice Kennedy noted that
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example,
parts of the brain involved in behavioral control continue to mature through
late adolescence.”135
Shortly after the Court’s decision in Graham, the Court essentially
extended that holding to juveniles convicted of homicidal offenses in Miller v.
Alabama.136 The holding in Miller is more moderate than its predecessors
because it does not create a categorical rule against an LWOP sentence.137
Instead, the Court simply held that a mandatory LWOP sentence for juveniles
convicted of any offense, including homicidal convictions, is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment.138 In other words, “as long as the [juvenile]
is permitted to introduce mitigating evidence of his immaturity and
circumstances, he or she could be subject to [an LWOP sentence.]”139 In
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that the neuroscience
evidence presented in the briefs filed with the Court demonstrated “that the

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

crime, they seem to have reemerged [in the discourse of Supreme Court justices.]”); see also Levick
et al., supra note 42, at 290–92 (explaining the U.S. Supreme Court’s evolving treatment of
juveniles).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
Id. at 483.
Id.
Scott, supra note 130, at 545 (emphasis added).
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science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions [had]
become even stronger.”140
The Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning of Miller in Montgomery v.
Louisiana.141 In Montgomery, the Court held that the holding in Miller rendered
an LWOP sentence constitutional only for the “rarest of juvenile offenders,
those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”142 The Court also
clarified that an LWOP sentence is an unconstitutionally excessive sentence
for juveniles “whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.”143 The opinion
further instructs how sentencing courts should evaluate these juveniles,
explaining that a sentencing court must conduct a hearing that considers a
juvenile’s “youth and attendant characteristics” as sentencing factors prior to
imposing an LWOP sentence.144 The Court reiterated the principle it
established in Roper, Graham, and Miller: “[C]hildren are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing” due to their “diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform.”145 Although the Supreme
Court has not yet considered whether the holdings in Miller and Graham apply
to de facto LWOP sentences,146 many state courts have considered this issue
and held that de facto LWOP sentences are subject to the holdings in Graham
and Miller.147

140

141
142
143
144

145
146

147

Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 n.5 (citations omitted); see also Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Science and
Juvenile Justice Policymaking, 23 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 410, 411 (2017) (recognizing that
“neuroscience warranted an entire paragraph of the majority opinion” in Miller).
577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016). In Montgomery, the Court was considering whether the holding in Miller
should be applied retroactively. Id. at 193.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 209–10. However, the Supreme Court recently held that a sentencing court is not required
to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility or an on-the-record sentencing
explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a juvenile to an
LWOP sentence. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2021). Although the majority claims
that this decision “does not overrule Miller or Montgomery,” id. at 1321, the dissent maintains that the
majority “guts” both Miller and Montgomery and “overrule[s] precedent without even acknowledging
it is doing so.” Id. at 1328, 1337 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1327 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (stating the majority “[o]verule[d] Montgomery in substance but not in
name”). Thus, the implications of this decision and the meaning of Miller remain unclear.
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206–07 (citations omitted).
Typically, a de facto LWOP sentence is when the aggregate total of years of imprisonment exceeds
the offender’s life expectancy. See, e.g., State v. Slocumb, 827 S.E.2d 148, 154–55 (S.C. 2019)
(explaining that an offender who committed several crimes with an average per-crime sentence of
twenty-six years, totaling a 130-year sentence, had received a de facto LWOP sentence).
See, e.g., People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293 (Cal. 2012) (holding that a sentence that required
the juvenile offender to serve over 100 years before becoming eligible for parole violated Graham);
State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 212 (N.J. 2017) (holding that Miller applies broadly). For a list of how
jurisdictions have resolved this issue, see Slocumb, 827 S.E.2d at 158–66.
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These Supreme Court holdings have ignited serious questions regarding
the role of science in juvenile justice jurisprudence. Neuroscience especially
has garnered significant attention in legal scholarship after it was explicitly
referenced in Graham and Miller.148 Although the Court principally cited to
neuroscience as secondary support for its claims on juvenile culpability, many
scholars have noted the increasingly influential role of neuroscience in the
Court’s decisions over time.149 For example, before the Court’s decision in
Roper, neuroscience played no role in the Court’s decisions about juvenile
culpability.150 Then, in Roper, the Court relied only on behavioral differences
without mentioning neuroscience.151 In Graham, the Court mentioned
neuroscience only in passing but two years later in Miller devoted an entire
paragraph to neuroscience, detailing the findings from neuroscience on
adolescent immaturity.152 This relatively quick progression has left many
wondering whether the Court’s focus has shifted mainly to behavioral science
and neuroscience for questions on diminished culpability.153 While
persuasive, the Court’s focus has not truly shifted to science. The Court has
recognized the diminished culpability of juveniles long before science could
offer any explanation. Indeed, the Court’s recent decisions only use science
as one way to affirm the longstanding perception of juvenile culpability, not
redefine it.
II. YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
A. Why Kids (Under 18) Are Different
The differences between adults and juveniles are substantial and justify
the conclusion that punishments imposed on juveniles should be less severe
than the punishments for adults.154 The U.S. Supreme Court has
emphatically declared that “children are different” and, in doing so, has

148
149

150
151
152
153
154

See Steinberg, supra note 140, at 411 (explaining how neuroscience became more influential in legal
policy after the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper and Graham).
Id.; see also Stephen J. Morse, The Status of NeuroLaw: A Plea for Current Modesty and Future Cautious
Optimism, 39 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 595, 616, 616 n.25 (2011) (arguing that the citation to
neuroscience in Graham was general and dictum).
Steinberg, supra note 140, at 411.
Id.
Id. at 411–12.
Id. at 411.
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 15.
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drawn from behavioral and neurobiological research for support.155 The
Court provides three overarching principles which summarily articulate the
general differences between juveniles and adults.156 First, juveniles are less
capable of engaging in mature judgment than adults.157 Second, juveniles
are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures.158 Third, juveniles are more capable of change than adults.159
1. Less Capable of Mature Judgment
The proposition that juveniles lack maturity has been widely
uncontroversial. Long before developmental research was recognized,
society understood that children possessed diminished capacities for mature
judgment.160 As the Court articulated in Roper, “any parent knows[,] . . . ‘[a]
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions
and decisions.’”161 By framing the behavioral evidence within the lens of
what “any parent knows,” the Court grounded its analysis in folk
psychology162 and built on commonsense explanations of juvenile antisocial
behavior with scientific evidence.

155

156

157
158
159
160
161
162

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481 (2012); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are Different”:
Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 72 (2016) (noting that the Supreme
Court “has announced a broad principle grounded in development knowledge that ‘children are
different’ from adult offenders”) (footnote omitted).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). The Supreme Court’s reliance on behavioral
and, more recently, neuroscientific evidence to explain the diminished capacity of juveniles is
consistent with most juvenile law scholars. However, it is worth noting that Professor Gideon Yaffe
offers a different account to explain why juveniles deserve a break from criminal responsibility. In
Yaffe’s view, juveniles deserve leniency because they are denied the right to vote and, accordingly,
cannot influence the criminal law. For a full account of Yaffe’s argument, see YAFFE, supra note 88.
But see Stephen J. Morse, Against the Received Wisdom: Why the Criminal Justice System Should Give Kids a
Break, 14 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 257, 259–60 (2020) (arguing that the diminished capacity for
responsibility is “a more appealing ground for giving kids a break than lack of say over the criminal
law”).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 570.
See id. at 569 (acknowledging that a juvenile’s lack of maturity is something that “any parent
knows”).
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
The term “folk psychology” is used by philosophers and cognitive scientists to refer to a reasongiving explanation that “accounts for human behavior as a product of intentions that arise from the
desires and beliefs of the agent.” Morse, supra note 2, at 18.
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One explanation as to why juveniles are, on average, less capable of
mature judgment than adults is that they have deficiencies in the psychosocial
domain.163 In a study that considered whether non-cognitive differences in
adults and juveniles could account for juveniles’ immature judgment, the
researchers found that psychosocial factors play a significant role in the
juvenile decision-making process.164 By considering three components of
maturity of judgment—responsibility, perspective, and temperance—the
study found that those components were more predictive of antisocial
decision-making than age alone.165 In effect, “psychosocially mature
[thirteen]-year-olds demonstrate less antisocial decision-making than
psychosocially immature adults.”166 However, juveniles are more likely to
exhibit psychosocial immaturity, which suggests that the average juvenile is
“less responsible, more myopic, and less temperate than the average
adult.”167
Psychosocial immaturity affects decision-making outcomes because
psychosocial factors influence values and preferences among juveniles.168
The most relevant psychosocial factors to juveniles’ mature judgment and
decision-making outcomes are susceptibility to peer pressure, future
orientation, attitudes towards risk, and the capacity for self-management.169
Significant research supports the notion that teenagers are more vulnerable
to peer influence than adults.170 Research also suggests that adults are more
“future-oriented” than juveniles, meaning adults can envision themselves in
the future over a significantly longer time frame.171 Moreover, juveniles are
more likely to discount their future and primarily consider short-term
consequences in their decision-making.172 This likely results from attitudes
towards risk, which juveniles generally weigh less substantially than adults.173

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

172
173

Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May
Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 741, 757 (2000).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 757.
Id.
Id.
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity,
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1012 (2003).
Id.
Id; see also infra Section II.A.2 (discussing juvenile vulnerability to peer pressure).
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 168, at 1012; see also Brief for the Am. Psych. Ass’n, Am. Psychiatric
Ass’n, & Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief for APA] (“Adolescents
. . . are less able to envision the future and apprehend the consequences of their actions.”).
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 168, at 1012.
Id.
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Research also suggests that juveniles are less likely to possess the ability to
control their impulses in their decision-making.174 As a result, risky behavior,
like criminal activity, is a normative characteristic of adolescent
development.175 In fact, it is statistically common for adolescents to engage
in crime during their youth, which likely explains the “age-crime curve.”176
It is important to distinguish immature juveniles from immature adults: “An
impulsive adolescent will almost certainly develop into an adult who is able
to exercise self-restraint.”177 On the other hand, an adult that continues to
behave like an impulsive teenager is likely going to behave that way
forever.178
These psychological studies are bolstered by the growing body of
neuroscientific research. Neuroscience, or brain science, looks to the brain
to explain and understand psychological phenomena like emotions,
thoughts, mood and anxiety disorders, addiction, and social problems.179
The advent of brain-imaging tools in recent years has allowed scientists to
study the brain and identify “neurobiological correlates of behavioral, social,
emotional, and developmental processes.”180 Although neuroscience has yet
to offer any new revelations on human behavior, it maintains legal relevance
because “[p]eople are persuaded much more by concrete rather than by
abstract evidence, and by neuroscience in particular.”181 Neuroscience has
provided some explanations of juvenile immaturity in physical terms.182
Specifically, research has found that brain development is causally linked to
reckless, antisocial behavior in juveniles because “areas of the brain that
govern impulse control, planning, and foresight of consequences mature
174
175

176

177
178
179
180
181

182

Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 7; see also Steinberg & Scott, supra note 168, at 1012 (finding some
support in the research that juveniles are more impulsive than adults).
Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 7; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 16 (“Terry Moffitt,
one of the world’s leading experts on the development of antisocial behavior, has described
delinquent behavior as ‘a normal part of teenage life.’”).
Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 7–8. The age-crime curve represents crimes that peak sharply
during adolescence but drastically drop in young adulthood. Id.; see also David P. Farrington, Rolf
Loeber & James C. Howell, Young Adult Offenders: The Need for More Effective Legislative Options and Justice
Processing, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 729, 734 (2012) (discussing age crime curve).
LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF
ADOLESCENCE 187 (2014).
Id.
Seth J. Schwartz, Scott O. Lilienfeld, Alan Meca & Katheryn C. Sauvigné, The Role of Neuroscience
Within Psychology: A Call for Inclusiveness Over Exclusiveness, 71 AM. PSYCH. 52, 54 (2016).
Id. at 55.
STEINBERG, supra note 177, at 190; see also Morse, supra note 149, at 606 (explaining that
“neuroscience adds nothing new” and may just be a “better, more persuasive science” to help
understand behavior).
STEINBERG, supra note 177, at 190.
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slowly over the course of adolescence and into early adulthood, while the
arousal of the limbic system around puberty increases sensation seeking in
early adolescence.”183
Executive functions have also garnered significant attention in the
neuroscience community regarding criminal responsibility.184 “Executive
functions allow us to plan actions and formulate intentions, to set and pursue
goals, to organize complex actions with multiple parts and phases, while not
losing our place, and establish or revise patterns of habitual behavior.”185
Executive functions exist within the frontal lobe of the brain.186 Brainimaging research has shown that the frontal lobes are structurally immature
into late adolescence and one of the last portions of the brain to fully
develop.187 Consequently, structural immaturity in the frontal lobe is
partially responsible for “deficits in response inhibition, planning ahead, and
weighing risks and rewards.”188 Indeed, the development of the frontal lobe
correlates with maturing executive functions.189 Notwithstanding the general
premise that the frontal lobes are structurally immature into late adolescence,
“[d]ifferent executive components mature along separable developmental
trajectories” and create disparities among individual juveniles’ executive
maturity.190 Simply put, there is not one age at which a child reaches
executive maturity.191
Juveniles’ immaturity does not necessarily mean that they are not
responsible; instead, it means that they are on average less responsible than
adults.192

183
184
185
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190
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Scott, supra note 155, at 87.
See id. at 85–87 (discussing how executive functions underpin the structure of criminal law).
HIRSTEIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 18.
Levick et al., supra note 42, at 298.
Id.
Id.; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 14 (“Studies of brain development show that
during adolescence, significant maturation occurs in brain systems and regions involved in longterm planning, impulse control, regulation of emotion, and evaluation of risk and reward.”) (citation
omitted).
Specifically, structural changes in the prefrontal cortex, which generally occur during adolescence,
parallel important changes in brain function like strengthening of activity in brain systems involving
self-regulation and self-control, hormone-related changes, and increases in simultaneous
involvement of multiple brain regions. HIRSTEIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 165.
Id. at 172.
Id.
STEINBERG, supra note 177, at 188; see also Steinberg & Scott, supra note 168, at 1010 (arguing that
juveniles’ developmental immaturity should mitigate culpability and justify more lenient
punishment but should not completely excuse their behavior).
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2. More Susceptible or Vulnerable to Negative Influences
Immaturity and vulnerability go hand in hand.193 Juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures because
of their lack of maturity.194 For example, external pressures from a juvenile’s
environment can increase a juvenile’s likelihood of engaging in antisocial
behavior.195 Juveniles are typically dependent on their families to provide for
their basic needs like housing and, more often than not, juveniles cannot
control their environment and they lack the freedom to change their
environment.196 Studies show that “[d]ifficult family and neighborhood
conditions are major risk factors for juvenile crime” and, without the
autonomy to escape those conditions, juveniles are vulnerable to these risk
factors.197
Peer pressure also proves to be especially indicative of risky behavior.198
Juveniles’ desire for social validation leads to difficulty in demonstrating
independence from peers.199 Without a strong sense of self, which juveniles
objectively do not have, adolescents rely on others to guide their decisionmaking and behavior.200 Interestingly, “exposure to peers during a risktaking task doubled the amount of risky behavior among mid-adolescents,”
showing that the “presence of peers makes adolescents and youth, but not
adults, more likely to take risks and more likely to make risky decisions.”201
Both direct and indirect peer pressure play a causal role in antisocial
behavior.202 For example, “adolescents make choices in response to direct
peer pressure to act in certain ways. More indirectly, adolescents’ desire for
peer approval—and fear of rejection—affect their choices, even without
direct coercion.”203 Adolescents also have increased difficulty deflecting or

193

194
195
196
197

198
199
200
201
202
203

Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 15; see also Steinberg & Scott, supra note 168, at 1014 (noting that
because of their developmental immaturity, juveniles respond adversely to external pressures that
adults can resist).
Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 15.
Id. at 12, 15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id.; see also YAFFE, supra note 88, at 1, 8 (arguing that juveniles have a diminished capacity for
criminal responsibility because they are politically disenfranchised—unable to have any say over
the laws that govern them).
Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 16.
Levick et al., supra note 42, at 295.
Id.
Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 16–17 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Levick et al., supra note 42, at 296.
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 168, at 1012.
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resisting peer pressure.204 As a result, exposure to delinquent peers
significantly correlates with juvenile crime because juveniles typically do not
commit crimes alone and are more likely to commit crimes in groups.205
Without the ability to resist peer pressure, juveniles are left vulnerable to
these negative influences in a way that adults are not.
Juveniles are also vulnerable to the adjudicative process because
developmental characteristics affect adjudicative competence.206
“Adjudicative competence involves a defendant’s ability to communicate
with lawyers or aid in his or her defense, to make legal decisions as well as
understand and participate in such legal procedures, to waive Miranda rights,
to waive or assist counsel, to stand trial, and to exercise other constitutional
protections.”207 Juveniles’ diminished developmental characteristics like
cognitive ability, psychosocial maturity, and judgment adversely affects their
adjudicative competence—making them vulnerable to the complexities of
the court system.208
3. More Capable of Change
Juveniles are more capable of change because adolescence is a transitory
period.209 A juvenile’s experience is “marked by rapid and dramatic
change[s]” in his or her biology, cognition, emotion, interpersonal
relationships, and social contexts.210 Rooted in the longstanding perception
of growth, the term “adolescence” derives from the Latin word adolescere,
which means “to grow into adulthood.”211 As juveniles grow, they become
more psychosocially mature. In particular, self-management skills, the ability
for long-term planning, judgement and decision-making, regulation of
emotion, and evaluation of risk and reward improve in functioning.212 As a
result, the factors associated with risky behavior are less intense and not as
correlative.213
The psychological literature is well established in its “distinction between
individuals who offend only during adolescence and those who persist
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 18–19.
Id. at 17.
Farrington et al., supra note 176, at 732.
Id.
Id.
Levick et al., supra note 42, at 297.
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 32.
Levick et al., supra note 42, at 297.
Id.
Id.
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offending into adulthood.”214 The overwhelming majority of delinquent
juveniles eventually desist and refrain from engaging in criminal behavior in
adulthood.215
Juveniles’ criminal conduct frequently derives from
experimenting with risky behavior, “not from deep-seated moral deficiency
reflective of ‘bad’ character.”216 Furthermore, research has demonstrated
that intervention is not necessary for juveniles to desist from criminal
behavior and become productive, law-abiding citizens.217
B. Young Adults: Do these Differences Stop at 18?
The age of maturity has different meanings in different systems. For
example, the age of criminal maturity is most commonly eighteen.218
However, the legal age to drive a car, consent to sexual intercourse, or even
rent a car from a rental car company can vary from sixteen to twenty-five.219
As discussed above, neuroscience research has shown that the brain
continues to develop into adulthood.220
Specifically, research has
conclusively found that the brain matures through adolescence and into the
early twenties, with large structural changes occurring in the frontal lobes
and within the prefrontal cortex.221 Unfortunately, this research cannot yet
offer a particular age for purposes of drawing legal distinction between young
adults and adults.222 Some studies suggest that people reach maturity
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-two.223 Other studies have found that
the brain’s higher executive functions like planning, verbal memory, and
impulse control are not fully developed until the age of twenty-five.224
Although the research might not yet be able to indicate one particular age
for legal majority, it remains clear that young adults on average share more
cognitive similarities with juveniles, not adults.225
214

215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

Id. But see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (“It is difficult even for expert psychologists
to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”).
Levick et al., supra note 42, at 298.
Brief for APA, supra note 171, at 20–21.
Levick et al., supra note 42, at 298.
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 16.
See Farrington et al., supra note 176, at 733 (explaining that rental car companies often bar drivers
younger than twenty-five years old from renting a car).
See supra notes 183–191 and accompanying text.
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 44.
STEINBERG, supra note 177, at 202.
Id.
Farrington et al., supra note 176, at 734.
Id. at 741; see also Lapp, supra note 3, at 364 (“[M]any of the cognitive features that distinguish
juveniles from adults also distinguish young adults from adults.”).
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Education also plays a role in extending adolescence into a person’s early
twenties because of the increase in college attendance.226 Post-secondary
education delays entry into the full-time labor force and provides young
adults with supportive institutions like teachers, counselors, and highly
structured programs.227 By prolonging education, many young adults
struggle to achieve financial independence and are forced to rely on parental
support for longer periods.228 These factors have led young adults to define
adulthood differently than previous generations.229 Rather than utilizing
formal markers like marriage or other life events to describe adulthood,
young adults primarily understand adulthood as encompassing more
intangible and psychological markers like becoming financially independent
or making independent decisions.230 In fact, many young adults do not have
a sense of adulthood until much later than the age of eighteen.231 By delaying
the transition into adulthood, young adults may “reap the benefits of a longer
period of plasticity during which higher-order brain systems continue to
mature.”232
A new conception of development has been recognized as accurately
reflecting the distinct differences of young adulthood when compared to
adolescence and adulthood.233 This new developmental stage has been
termed “emerging adulthood.”234 Emerging adulthood encompasses ages
eighteen through twenty-five and is a period of life when “many different
directions remain possible, when little about the future has been decided for
certain, when the scope of independent exploration of life’s possibilities is
greater for most people than it will be at any other period of the life
course.”235 This new theory of development reinforces the notion that young
226
227
228
229
230
231
232

233
234
235

Lapp, supra note 3, at 364–65.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 365–66.
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id.
STEINBERG, supra note 177, at 164. However, the benefits that come from delaying the transition
into adulthood are not distributed equally. Youth of color and economically poor youth tend to
begin adolescence and transition into adulthood sooner because they lack the economic and social
resources to extend adolescence. In addition, studies have shown that youth of color are likely to
be viewed as older than their chronological age. As a result, economically poor youth and youth
of color are at a higher risk of contact with the criminal justice system than other youth. See Lapp,
supra note 3, at 369–71; see also STEINBERG, supra note 177, at 177 (“[T]he general trend towards a
longer adolescence has been far more advantageous to the privileged than to the underprivileged.”).
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from Late Teens Through the Twenties,
55 AM. PSYCH. 469, 469 (2000).
Id.
Id.
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adults are not similarly situated to adults and must, at the very least, be
conceptualized differently when considering criminal justice policies and
criminal responsibility.
The evidence is clear that the brain continues to develop into a person’s
early twenties, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the current divide between
juvenile and adult. Even as early as 1989, Justice Brennan identified the
arbitrariness of the age of eighteen as the line drawn by society for maturity
and responsibility.236 Justice Brennan acknowledged that eighteen is a
“conservative estimate of the dividing line between adolescence and
adulthood” and that maturity does not occur until the early twenties.237
Scholars have also argued that the age of criminal maturity should be raised
to the mid-twenties to better address the effects of brain development.238
Policymakers and the public have also begun to grapple with the legitimacy
of legal regulations and current criminal justice policies in light of this
evidence.239 Despite the widespread recognition that the brain continues to
develop into a person’s twenties, the U.S. Supreme Court has not considered
whether young adults should be treated similarly to juveniles regarding
criminal responsibility.
III. RESPONDING TO YOUNG ADULT DIFFERENCES
The overwhelming evidence illustrating that young adults are more
similar to juveniles than adults has led to the implementation of many public
policies. As a point of global comparison, Switzerland sentences young adults
as juveniles, and Germany extends its juvenile jurisdiction to the age of
twenty-one.240 In the United States, states and counties have enacted a
variety of policies focused on addressing young adult criminal
responsibility.241 Relatively recently, more than a dozen jurisdictions have
created a new criminal justice institution, young adult courts.242 Young adult
offenders have also challenged the constitutionality of their sentences,
arguing that continuing to blame and punish them without any consideration
for their diminished responsibility violates the Constitution.243 This section
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 396 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted).
Farrington et al., supra note 176, at 734.
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 44.
Alex A. Stamm, Note, Young Adults Are Different, Too: Why and How We Can Create a Better Justice System
for Young People Age 18 to 25, 95 TEX. L. REV. 72, 79 (2017).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 88.
See infra Section III.B.
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will evaluate the effectiveness of young adult courts and the validity of the
constitutional claims.
A. Young Adult Court
Young adult courts, like juvenile courts, create a distinct system designed
for young adults244 and are generally modeled after specialty, problemsolving courts like drug courts.245 There is no uniform young adult court
system and each jurisdiction with a young adult court utilizes a somewhat
different model.246 In 2004, Douglas County, Nebraska, established the
country’s first young adult court.247 Under Nebraska’s model, the young
adult court provides alternative sentencing for young adults charged with a
felony offense up to the age of twenty-five.248 The goal of the program is “to
stabilize participant’s lives by providing tools for success”; these tools come
in the forms of “community supervision, substance use treatment, mental
health assistance, education, employment, and frequent drug testing.”249
Other jurisdictions have implemented similar systems, but the most
progressive model is the San Francisco Young Adult Court, established in
2015.250 The San Francisco model “functions more like a distinct justice
system.”251 Under the San Francisco model, young adults, ages eighteen to
twenty-four, may be eligible for the program.252 The young adult court is
open to all criminal offenses, including crimes that allege serious bodily
injury.253 However, the District Attorney must agree to defer the young adult
to young adult court in many serious felony charges.254 The Superior Court

244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

253

254

Lapp, supra note 3, at 390.
Stamm, supra note 240, at 88.
Lapp, supra note 3, at 390.
Id. at 390–91.
Problem-Solving Courts, ST. NEB. JUD. BRANCH, https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/courts/
problem-solving-courts [https://perma.cc/G7RG-VZV4] (last visited Feb. 28, 2020).
Id.
Lapp, supra note 3, at 392.
Id.
CAL.
SUPER.
CT.,
S.F.
CNTY.,
YOUNG
ADULT
COURT,
https://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/divisions/collaborative/yac [https://perma.cc/M69V-MXB5]
(last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
CAL. SUPER. CT., S.F. CNTY., SAN FRANCISCO COLLABORATIVE COURT ELIGIBILITY
GUIDELINES: COMMUNITY JUSTICE COURT, DRUG COURT, YOUNG ADULT COURT,
MISDEMEANOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH COURT JUNE 1, 2016–DECEMBER 31, 2016,
https://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/default/files/images/REVISED.DEC2017.%202016Coll
aborativeCourtEligiblityGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/87CM-3PK9] (last visited Feb. 29,
2020) [hereinafter S.F. COLLABORATIVE COURT ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES].
Id.
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of California for the County of San Francisco expressly credits the growing
body of research that differentiates young adults from juveniles and adults as
one of the reasons for the establishment of the young adult court.255 The
court cites the developing prefrontal cortex as well as structural societal
changes to justify departing from the traditional justice system model.256
Moreover, the San Francisco Young Adult Court recognizes that the
traditional justice system “is not designed to address cases involving these
individuals, who are qualitatively different in development, skills, and needs
from both children and older adults.”257
The San Francisco Young Adult Court aims to ensure public safety and
reduce recidivism, increase the assets of young adults, provide a meaningful
path to reducing or eliminating young adults’ criminal records, and increase
collaboration among community resources.258 Additionally, all of the staff
members that work within the San Francisco Young Adult Court are
specially trained to address the developmental needs of young adults.259 This
young adult court model intends to treat its cases more like a juvenile court
by focusing on individualized, community-based, and rehabilitative
services.260 The San Francisco Young Adult Court also values procedural
fairness by affording the following protections to young adults: “Opportunity
to be heard; decisions based on facts and program rules that are applied
consistently; serious considerations of their concerns; and a program that acts
in their best interest.”261
The young adult court system has seen some success since its
implementation. Legal experts “recommend young adult courts as a means
of effectively responding to young adult offending.”262 Although there has
not yet been a statistically significant number of graduates from the San
Francisco Young Adult Court, the court has published the outcomes of its
participants thus far. Seventy-five young adults have successfully completed
the San Francisco Young Adult Court, and 84% of those graduates have

255
256
257
258
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260
261
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YOUNG ADULT COURT, supra note 252.
Id.
Id.
CAL. SUPER. CT., S.F. CNTY., YOUNG ADULT COURT: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 3–
4 (Aug. 2019), https://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/default/files/images/YACPolices
ProceduresAug2019AppendicesFINAL.pdf?1580836257412 [https://perma.cc/R7Y5-5WMS]
[hereinafter YOUNG ADULT COURT: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL].
Lapp, supra note 3, at 393.
Id. at 396.
YOUNG ADULT COURT: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 258, at 4.
Stamm, supra note 240, at 88.
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avoided re-arrest.263 While there is still not enough data to draw a definitive
conclusion on the effectiveness of young adult courts, these early outcomes
may indicate that young adult courts have the potential to reduce recidivism
while saving costs because these young adults are able to avoid short-term
and long-term incarceration.264
Young adults are uniquely situated in human development and pose
different challenges to criminal responsibility than juveniles. Specifically,
young adults may vary greatly with regard to their financial independence,
dependency on family, and involvement in the labor force or educational
institutions.265 With such diversity among young adults, case-by-case
determinations are likely necessary to sufficiently mitigate their culpability in
sentencing. Young adult courts establish a system for young adults that is
distinct from both the juvenile court system and the adult criminal court
system and can better address the complexities of young adulthood in a
uniform, specialized manner.
B. Judicial Intervention
The developments in behavioral and neuroscientific research have raised
questions surrounding public policy and the adjudication of young adults in
adult criminal court. In light of this research, questions regarding justice and
fairness necessarily follow. Centuries of differential treatment for juveniles
has reinforced our justice system’s commitment to attributing blame and
punishment only to those who are criminally responsible. Continuing to
blame and punish young adults as adults without any recognition for their
diminished responsibility has invoked, and will continue to invoke, judicial
review. The constitutional arguments that are most relevant to this issue are:
(1) Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the Eighth Amendment and (2)
Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. This section evaluates
each constitutional challenge and shows the reluctancy of the judiciary to
significantly change the binary juvenile-adult court system.

263
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Of the 361 young adults that were referred to San Francisco’s young adult court, 281 individuals
participated as of August 2015. CAL. SUPER. CT., S.F. CNTY., SAN FRANCISCO COLLABORATIVE
COURTS:
YOUNG
ADULT
COURTS
(Apr.
2019),
https://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/default/files/images/YACFactSheet_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VM5W-AJZC].
See Lapp, supra note 3, at 396 (finding that, while “minimizing the substantial costs of incarceration,”
young adult courts can “advance therapeutic justice and a successful transition to adulthood”).
See supra notes 226–231 and accompanying text (discussing how social factors can influence young
adult development).
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1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”266
The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”267 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment “has been
interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner.”268 When a punishment is
challenged under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court commonly
invokes the proportionality principle.269 Under the proportionality principle,
the Court considers whether the specific punishment is disproportionate to
the crime.270 By reviewing the constitutionality of punishments through the
lens of proportionality, the Court can respond to changes in public opinion
as society becomes “enlightened by a humane justice.”271
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, the Court
mainly applied the proportionality principle to challenges to the death
penalty.272 While the Court did not foreclose the possibility of applying the
proportionality principle to challenges to noncapital punishments, it
acknowledged that “successful challenges to the proportionality of [prison]
sentences [would be] exceedingly rare.”273 The longstanding practice of
distinguishing challenges to capital punishment from challenges to
noncapital punishment was based on the Supreme Court’s view that “[d]eath
is different.”274 The notion that death is different first arose in Justice
Stewart’s concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, the case that briefly ceased
capital punishment in the United States.275 Justice Stewart explained:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment,
not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique
in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal

266
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268
269
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U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Id. at 171.
Elizabeth Bennion, Death Is Different No Longer: Abolishing the Insanity Defense is Cruel and Unusual Under
Graham v. Florida, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910) (“[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned
to offense.”).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 378).
Bennion, supra note 269, at 25.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 104 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
Id. at 103.
Bennion, supra note 269, at 10 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is
embodied in our concept of humanity.276

Because of this conception of the death penalty, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that capital punishment “is categorically too harsh a
penalty to apply to certain types of crimes and certain classes of offenders.”277
For example, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court ruled that the death
penalty is categorically too harsh when imposed on a juvenile offender.278
Likewise, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty is categorically too harsh when imposed for the sole crime of rape of
a child.279 However, the Supreme Court in Graham blurred the distinction
between capital and noncapital punishments and arguably abandoned the
death is different philosophy.280 In Graham, the Court created a categorical
rule barring juveniles from receiving an LWOP sentence for non-homicide
offenses.281 In other words, the Court stated that an LWOP sentence is
categorically too harsh when imposed on a juvenile for a non-homicide
offense—a ruling typically reserved only for the death penalty.282
Surprisingly, the Court did little to rationalize its break from tradition and
simply resolved that the prior case law just happened to only involve capital
punishment.283
The Supreme Court in Graham effectively redefined the proportionality
principle by shifting the analysis from capital versus noncapital challenges to
categorical versus individual challenges.284 Justice Kennedy, delivering the
opinion in Graham, explained that the Supreme Court’s prior cases
“addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two general
classifications.”285 Individual challenges, the first classification of cases,
involve challenges to the length of term-of-year sentences given all the facts
in a particular case.286 When reviewing these individual challenges, the
Court first compares the gravity of the offense and the severity of the

276
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Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 100 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (Alito, J. dissenting).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 102–03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 82 (majority opinion).
Id. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Bennion, supra note 269, at 24 (“Graham is the first
Supreme Court case to categorically exclude a population from a specific punishment other than
death.”).
Bennion, supra note 269, at 25.
Id.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 59.
Id.
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sentence.287 If this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality, then the Court should “compare the defendant’s sentence
with sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with
the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.”288 If the
sentence is still grossly disproportionate after this secondary comparison,
then the sentence is unconstitutional.289
As for the second classification of cases, Justice Kennedy acknowledged
that the cases historically involved challenges the death penalty.290 But he
repackaged the second classification of cases in Graham as categorical
challenges, or cases that have “used categorical rules to define Eighth
Amendment standards.”291 In effect, the Court construed the second
classification to involve any categorical challenges to a sentence, regardless
of whether it was a capital or noncapital sentence. When reviewing
categorical challenges, the Court uses a two-step approach. First, the Court
analyzes the “‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in
legislative enactments and state practice,’ to determine whether there is a
national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”292 Second, the
Court brings its own judgment to bear on the issue.293 In exercising its
independent judgment, the Court is “guided by ‘the standards elaborated by
controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and
purpose.’”294 Independent judgment also requires the Court to consider the
offenders’ culpability, the severity of the punishment, and penological
goals.295
The decision in Graham to redefine the proportionality principle was not
an anomaly. The Supreme Court again invoked this analysis in Miller v.
Alabama.296 In Miller, the Court utilized the two-step approach articulated in
Graham and adopted a categorical rule barring juveniles from ever receiving
a mandatory LWOP sentence.297 In his dissenting opinion in Miller, Justice
Thomas understood the majority’s holding as an “ever-expanding”
287
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289
290
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292
293
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Id. at 60 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)).
Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005).
Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008)).
Id. at 67.
567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in Miller).
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application of the proportionality principle.298 Indeed, after Graham and
Miller, the once prominent view of the Court that death is different is
arguably abrogated and the proportionality principle will continue to apply
to noncapital cases.
Eighth Amendment challenges to sentences imposed on juveniles have
significantly altered how legal institutions can blame and punish juvenile
offenders. The success of those challenges has motivated nearly identical
challenges from young adults. Specifically, young adult offenders argue that
the Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller (“Roper line of
cases”) must be extended to young adults under the Eighth Amendment. In
other words, young adults contend that the courts should treat young adults
as juveniles for purposes of punishment.
Many courts have already been confronted with the question of whether
certain sentences imposed on young adults violate the Eighth Amendment.
Almost universally, federal and state courts have rejected those constitutional
challenges. All of the circuit courts for the U.S. Court of Appeals that have
considered this question have ruled definitively against extending any of the
holdings in the Roper line of cases to young adults.299 Likewise, almost every
state court faced with this issue has also refused such an extension.300 While
298
299

300

Miller, 567 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Gonzalez, 981 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. Sierra, 933 F.3d 95,
97 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom., Lopez-Cabrera v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 2541 (2020); In re
Liebel, No. 13-2907 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2013); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 609 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 278 (2018); In re Frank, 690 F. App’x 146 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013); Wright v. United States, 902 F.3d 868, 871–72 (8th
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1207 (2019); United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1040 (10th
Cir. 2017); Melton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015).
The following states have rejected arguments that seek to extend any of the holdings in the Roper
line of cases to young adults: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
These cases include: Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 84 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012); State v. Pieck, No.
1 CA-CR 14-0585 PRPC, 2016 WL 4626703 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2016); Benton v. Kelley, 602
S.W.3d 96 (Ark. 2020); People v. Flores, 462 P.3d 919 (Cal. 2020); Woods v. Comm’r of Corr., 232
A.3d 63 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020); Zebroski v. State, 179 A.3d 855 (Del. 2018); Branch v. State, 236
So. 3d 981 (Fla. 2018); Gandy v. State, 718 S.E.2d 287 (Ga. 2011); Hairston v. State, 472 P.3d 44
(Idaho 2020); People v. Harris, 120 N.E.3d 900 (Ill. 2018); Malone v. State, 150 N.E.3d 1099 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2020) (unpublished table decision); Nassif v. State, No. 17-0762 (Iowa Ct. App. July 5,
2018); State v. Ruggles, 304 P.3d 388 (Kan. 2013); State v. Tucker, 181 So. 3d 590 (La. 2015);
West v. State, No. 2105 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 31, 2018); People v. Manning, 951 N.W.2d 905
(Mich. 2020); Nelson v. State, 947 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 2020); Scott v. State, 938 So. 2d 1233 (Miss.
2006), overruled on other grounds by Lynch v. State, 951 So. 2d 549 (Miss. 2007); State v. Barnett, 598
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some state courts have left the question open by avoiding a decision on the
merits,301 as of this writing, only one court has clearly split from the prevailing
case law.302 Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court, relying heavily on
neuroscience developments, extended the holding in Miller, which barred
mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles, to offenders between the ages of
eighteen and twenty.303

301

302
303

S.W.3d 127 (Mo. 2020) (en banc); Jonson v. State, 148 P.3d 767 (Nev. 2006); State v. Cook, No. A4419-18T4, 2020 WL 1487727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23, 2020); State v. Hopkins, No.
S-1-SC-35052, 2016 WL 3128776 (N.M. May 26, 2016); People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.S.3d 719 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2019); State v. Garcell, 678 S.E.2d 618 (N.C. 2009); State v. Graham, No. 2016-1882,
2020 WL 7391565 (Ohio Dec. 17, 2020); Mitchell v. State, 235 P.3d 640 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010);
State v. Holler, 944 N.W.2d 339 (S.D. 2020); Pike v. State, No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011
WL 1544207 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2011); Rivers v. State, No. AP-77,051, 2017 WL 6505792
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2017); State v. Perea, 322 P.3d 624 (Utah 2013); State v. Rideout, 933
A.2d 706 (Vt. 2007); State v. McDermott, 810 N.W.2d 237 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012); Nicodemus v.
State, 392 P.3d 408 (Wyo. 2017).
In Commonwealth v. Watt, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that it had previously
declined to extend the holdings of the Roper line of cases to young adults, but the court also
recognized that the research on brain science has progressed to the point where the court should
reconsider the age of criminal majority. 146 N.E.3d 414, 428 (Mass. 2020). However, the court
declined to rule on the merits as the record was not fully developed. Id. The court remanded the
case for a full development of the record regarding brain development so the court could make an
informed decision on the constitutionality of an LWOP sentence imposed on young adults. Id.; see
also Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (confining its holding not to extend
the Roper line of cases to young adults only to cases on post-conviction review and recognizing that
an extension is possible on direct appeal); Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409, 423 (Ky. 2020)
(reversing the trial court’s pre-trial decision that the death penalty is unconstitutional for offenders
ages twenty-one or younger on the grounds of justiciability and recognizing that the issue can be
considered only on the merits after a conviction and sentence). The Illinois Supreme Court has left
the issue open under its state constitution, while rejecting an extension of the Roper line of cases to
young adults under the U.S. Constitution. People v. Harris, 120 N.E.3d 900, 908–11, 914 (Ill.
2018).
Matter of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276, 288 (Wash. 2021).
Id. at 284–86, 288. Notably, the Washington Supreme Court in Monschke decided the issue under
its state constitution, not the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 279 n.6; see also id. (“[I]n the context of juvenile
sentencing, [the Washington state constitution] provides greater protection than the Eighth
Amendment.”) (citation omitted). Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court declined to apply
its categorical bar test, which is identical to the analysis used by U.S. Supreme Court for categorical
challenges, because it concluded that the categorical bar test only applies to determinations of
whether a punishment is categorically too cruel, not determinations of whether an existing
constitutional protection should apply to an enlarged class of offenders. Id. at 280. Meaning, since
the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller already determined that a mandatory LWOP sentence is
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that it only had
to decide whether an arbitrary distinction between juveniles and young adults between the ages of
eighteen and twenty for purposes of mandatory LWOP sentences passed constitutional muster. Id.
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court avoided the traditional two-step framework for categorical
challenges. See id. at 292 (Owens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority crafted a “false distinction
to sidestep” the categorical bar test).

1178

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:5

A few different rationales have been offered by the courts for rejecting
such constitutional challenges. Most often, the courts simply apply the
holdings articulated in the Roper line of cases without much analysis. For
example, in State v. Barnett, the Missouri Supreme Court considered whether
the imposition of a mandatory LWOP sentence on a nineteen-year-old
offender was constitutional in light of newly available scientific evidence
indicating that nineteen-year-old offenders display the “transient, hallmark
features of adolescence affecting risk and impulse control.”304 The court in
Barnett plainly stated that it was constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
precedent, “which clearly defines a juvenile as an individual younger than
[eighteen] years of age,” and affirmed the LWOP sentence.305 The Missouri
Supreme Court understood an extension of the holding in Miller to a
nineteen-year-old offender as contrary to the precedent established by the
Supreme Court. This reasoning is quite common, and it allows courts to
consider the issue on the merits with little to no constitutional analysis.306
Courts have even reasoned that a strict application of the Roper line of
cases is required because the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged the
arbitrariness of drawing the line of criminal majority at eighteen years old.
Indeed, in Roper, the Supreme Court admitted that the “qualities that
distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns
[eighteen]” but still concluded that “a line must be drawn.”307 Accordingly,
lower courts have considered that language to be highly instructive and
indicative of how the Supreme Court would consider additional scientific
evidence showing that young adults have similar qualities to juveniles.308 For
example, in United States v. Marshall, the Sixth Circuit relied on that language
in Roper to conclude that the “Supreme Court has recognized that drawing

304
305
306

307
308

Barnett, 598 S.W.3d at 130.
Id. at 133.
See, e.g., Woods, 232 A.3d at 80 (explaining that the holding in Miller is “limited to cases in which the
defendant is younger than eighteen at the time of the crime”); Hopkins, 2016 WL 3128776, at *5
(“Defendant was twenty-one years old at the time he committed these murders and certainly not
within the parameters established by Roper. Because Defendant was a legal adult, we cannot
categorically treat him as a juvenile offender under Roper.”); Graham, 2020 WL 7391565, at *28
(“[B]ecause the United States Supreme Court has drawn the line at 18 for Eighth Amendment
purposes, state courts are not free to invoke the Eighth Amendment as authority for drawing it at a
higher age. . . . [Therefore,] Roper is controlling, and we must follow it.”).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 947 N.W.2d 31, 39 (Minn. 2020) (recognized that the “Supreme Court
determined that a ‘clear line’ must be drawn, even when such a line is under-inclusive”); Tisius v.
State, 519 S.W.3d 413, 431 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) (“The Supreme Court . . . recognized the potential
for a defendant’s mental age to differ from his or her biological age but, nonetheless, implemented
a bright line rule as to the minority age for imposition of the death penalty.”).
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lines based on chronological age is a not-entirely-desirable but nonetheless
necessary approach.”309 Similarly, in United States v. Chavez, while the Fourth
Circuit conceded that individual differences in maturity will lead to
“imperfect fits” and arbitrariness, the court still concluded that such
differences do not make age-based rules unconstitutional.310
Constitutional challenges have also been rejected by the courts based on
the view that there is no national consensus to extend the Roper line of cases
to young adults. As explained above, when evaluating Eighth Amendment
challenges, a court must first determine whether there is a national consensus
against the challenged sentencing practice.311 To establish such a national
consensus, young adult defendants have commonly pointed to (1) the
emerging scientific consensus that young adults are less responsible because
brain development continues into mid-twenties,312 (2) a 2018 resolution from
the American Bar Association House of Delegates, which urged jurisdictions
that impose capital punishment to prohibit imposing the death penalty on
offenders who were twenty-one years old or younger at the time of the
crime,313 (3) state laws that recognize the status of young adulthood as a
mitigating factor at sentencing,314 and (4) the prevalence of certain
punishments imposed on young adults.315 Despite these purported changes,
courts have not been persuaded that these developments constitute a national
consensus.316 For instance, in Hairston v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court
309
310
311
312

313

314

315

316

United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 609 (4th Cir. 2018).
Supra note 292 and accompanying text.
See Hairston v. State, 472 P.3d 44, 49 (Idaho 2020) (noting that the defendant relies on report that
argues “there is a new emerging consensus that many aspects of psychological and neurobiological
immaturity characteristic of early adolescents and middle adolescents are also characteristics of late
adolescents aged nineteen and twenty” to show evolving standards of decency).
See id. at 46–47 (explaining that defendant relied on the ABA resolution to show evolving standards
of decency); People v. Flores, 462 P.3d 919, 966 (Cal. 2020) (noting that the defendant pointed to
the ABA resolution to show national consensus).
See Pike v. State, No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1544207, at *64 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 25, 2011) (highlighting that the defendant relied on, inter alia, a Tennessee state law that
recognizes youth as a statutory mitigating factor at sentencing); Flores, 462 P.3d at 966 (noting that
the defendant relied on a California state law that expanded “youth offender parole hearings” to
inmates who were twenty-five or younger at the time of the crime).
See Pike, 2011 WL 1544207, at *64–65 (“Tennessee has not executed anyone who was younger than
twenty-three at the time of the offense . . . . Only 7.7% of Tennessee’s present death-sentenced
inmates were nineteen or under at the time of the crime.”).
See, e.g., Flores, 462 P.3d at 966 (“[T]hese developments do not establish the ‘national consensus’
necessary to justify a categorical bar on the death penalty for individuals between the ages of
[eighteen] and [twenty-one] at the time of their offenses.”); Hairston, 472 P.3d at 49 (“While we are
not blind to the national and international trends . . . , [the defendant] has provided no evidence
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refused to extend the holding in Roper to young adults, reasoning that
legislative bodies serve as the basis for determining national consensus and
there is no consensus among the legislative bodies of the states that still use
the death penalty to extend the prohibition against the death penalty to
young adults.317 In other words, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that
the legislatures of the states that still impose capital punishment have not
enacted any laws that create such an extension. This rationale tracks closely
with the reasoning in the Roper line of cases. In Roper, the Supreme Court
found evidence of national consensus based on the abolition of the juvenile
death penalty in the majority of states, the infrequency of its use in the states
that have not abolished it, and the consistent downward trend toward
abolishing its use.318 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Graham observed the
abolition of juvenile LWOP sentences in several states and the infrequency
of juvenile LWOP sentences for nonhomicidal offenses.319 The Supreme
Court has even specified that the laws enacted by state legislatures are the
“clearest and most reliable” objective evidence of national consensus.320 As
a result, many lower courts only consider state legislative action, which leads
those courts to dismiss new scientific evidence and policy resolutions as
immaterial developments. Even the other arguments that point to mitigating
factors at sentencing and the prevalence of certain sentences are unavailing
in light of the fact there is no evidence of state laws barring certain
punishments on young adults. Without any action from the state legislatures
directly on the issue of punishments for young adults, successfully
demonstrating national consensus is unlikely.321
Courts have also reasoned that neuroscience alone cannot justify
extending the holdings in the Roper line of cases to young adults. This

317
318
319
320
321

that a consensus exists among those states that continue to exercise the death penalty about this
issue.”). In Monschke (the case that extended Miller to defendants twenty years old and younger),
one of the points of contention between the majority and dissent was whether there was a national
consensus. 482 P.3d 276, 280 n.8 (Wash. 2021). While the majority conceded that there is
“certainly no national majority of state legislatures or courts prohibiting mandatory LWOP” for
defendants twenty years old and younger, it argued that there is “definitely an affirmative trend
among states to carve out rehabilitative space for ‘young’ or ‘youthful’ offenders as old as their mid[twenties].” Id. (citations omitted). But see id. at 293–94 (Owens, J., dissenting) (arguing that there
is neither a national consensus of states prohibiting mandatory LWOP sentences for defendants
twenty years old and younger nor any affirmative trend to carve out a rehabilitative space).
Hairston, 472 P.3d at 50.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)).
But see Monschke, 428 P.3d at 280 n.8 (observing an affirmative trend among states to “carve out
rehabilitative space” for young adults).
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rationale is arguably the most compelling as it squarely addresses what effect
neuroscience should have on sentencing jurisprudence for young adults. In
United States v. Gonzalez, the defendant argued that the Roper line of cases were
based on outdated science and modern scientific consensus required the
holding in Miller to apply to all offenders below the age of twenty-one.322 The
First Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that “scientific evidence is
merely one factor, among an array of factors, that the [Supreme] Court has
considered when invalidating certain criminal sentences imposed on
juveniles.”323 The First Circuit noted in particular that the scientific
consensus on brain development was not the exclusive rationale in the Roper
line of cases.324 Instead, the court in Gonzalez understood the empirical
studies cited in the Roper line of cases as offered to merely provide further
support for the notion that juveniles were less culpable.325 The court opined
that the Supreme Court chose the age of eighteen as the categorical divide
between juveniles and adults after balancing environmental and societal
factors and concluding that eighteen “represented the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”326
Indeed, arguments that rely solely on physiological development ignore the
Supreme Court’s multifaceted approach in the Roper line of cases and
improperly elevate neuroscience research from one of many factors to the
sole determinant of where to draw the line between young adult offenders
and adults.327
The Delaware Supreme Court expressed almost identical reasoning in
Zebroski v. State.328 The court in Zebroski highlighted two problems with using
scientific evidence to extend the Roper line of cases to young adults. First, the
court believed that the Supreme Court had already considered such evidence
and rejected it, explaining that the Court in Roper was aware that “children
do not transform into psychologically-and neurologically-mature adults on
their eighteenth birthdays” and that the Court’s holding was not founded on
a “now-outdated understanding of adolescent development.”329 Second, the
Delaware Supreme Court asserted that scientific evidence was not the sole

322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329

United States v. Gonzalez, 981 F.3d 11, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2020).
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 21.
179 A.3d 855, 862 (Del. 2018).
Id. at 861.
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(or even primary) reason to draw the line at eighteen years old.330 As the
Delaware Supreme Court read it, the majority opinion in Roper “retreated
from the science to a more conventional, law-controlled analysis” and chose
the age of eighteen based on the societal markers of adulthood, not the most
advanced science of the time.331 This understanding of the Supreme Court’s
use of scientific evidence in the Roper line of cases necessitated the court’s
conclusion in Zebroski: Developments in neuroscience do not support
redrawing the line of criminal majority because it is society’s collective
judgment that draws that line.332
Other courts have also recognized that new scientific evidence only
confirms existing views of young adults, which derive from society’s
conventional wisdom. For example, in State v. McDermott, a Wisconsin state
court compared new scientific findings on young adults’ brain development
to observations made by ancient Greek philosophers on the behavior of
young adults.333 Specifically, the court referenced the work of Aristotle and
Homer to illustrate that impulsivity in adolescence “has been known since
humans were able to observe their environment.”334 In the court’s view, new
scientific evidence only “puts the old wine of human experience in the new
bottles of recent research and labels the entire package as ‘new.’”335 This
understanding of scientific research essentially confines its role to influencing
policy decisions. Some courts have stated that new scientific evidence should
be used to convince state legislatures to change the laws, not as the basis for
legal relief.336 While these courts admit that the implications of new scientific
evidence give rise to ethical, moral, and public policy concerns, they
maintain that legislative bodies are better equipped to address those concerns
than the courts.337

330
331
332

333
334
335
336
337

Id. at 862.
Id. (alterations in original omitted) (citation omitted).
Id.; see also People v. Harris, 120 N.E.3d 900, 913–14 (Ill. 2018) (noting that “[n]ew research findings
do not necessarily alter [the] traditional line between adults and juveniles” because the decisions in
the Roper line of cases were “not based primarily on scientific research”); People v. Sanchez, 98
N.Y.S.3d 719, 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) (“[T]he precise place the line has been drawn is based on
law and policy considerations, not science.”).
810 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., State v. Lauderdale, No. 37141-7-III, 2020 WL 7664232, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 24,
2020) (noting brain science might persuade the state legislature).
See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 947 N.W.2d 31, 39–40 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted) (“It is a wellestablished principle that crimes and sentences are within the province of the Legislature.”).
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A review of the case law clearly demonstrates that Eighth Amendment
challenges to sentences imposed on young adults will continually fail. The
cases demonstrate two general patterns regarding how courts have treated
these challenges. On the one hand, most courts simply rejected the
challenges after narrowly applying the holdings in the Roper line of cases
without any notable analysis. On the other hand, some courts were willing
to engage in the constitutional analysis and grapple with the significance of
this new scientific research in young adult sentencing. However, even those
courts continued to reject the challenges. By reviewing these decisions in the
aggregate, a common narrative is revealed: Neuroscience is not enough.
The landmark holdings in the Roper line of cases were not the product of
science alone. In the Roper line of cases, before even considering the scientific
research, the Supreme Court reviewed legislative trends to determine
whether there was evidence of a national consensus against the sentencing
practice. Only after finding sufficient evidence of national consensus, the
Court shifted its attention to the culpability of juveniles. In concluding that
juveniles are less culpable than adults, the Court certainly relied on new
scientific evidence, which included neuroscience. However, neuroscience
did not compel that conclusion. A more plausible reading of the Roper line
of cases is that the Court used new scientific research as one way to explain
why juveniles have diminished culpability. The Supreme Court has long
understood juveniles as less culpable than adults and this understanding
existed well before neuroscience could offer any explanation. Young adults
relying on new scientific evidence to challenge the constitutionality of their
punishments undervalue the persuasiveness of conventional wisdom and how
that wisdom primarily contributed to the outcomes in the Roper line of cases.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s use of new scientific evidence in the Roper line
of cases can be best understood as bolstering longstanding societal views on
juvenile culpability, not as disrupting those views. Young adults, on the other
hand, have used new scientific evidence in a fundamentally different way—
they have used it to disrupt societal views on young adult culpability since
society does not perceive young adult culpability similarly to juvenile
culpability.
2. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
“No State . . . shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
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protection of the laws.”338 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause
as guaranteeing that “all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.”339 However, the Supreme Court has noted that the Constitution
“does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated
in law as though they were the same.”340 Legislatures have the initial
discretion to decide what is different and what is the same.341 That is,
legislative bodies can enact discriminatory laws that treat similar people
differently. But the legislatures cannot enact such laws with impunity.
Indeed, if the government enacts a discriminatory law, the law may be
susceptible to an equal protection challenge. All courts evaluating equal
protection challenges must answer the same broad question: Is the
discrimination justified by a sufficient purpose?342 In order to answer this
broader question, three more specific questions must be asked: (1) What is
the classification? (2) What level of scrutiny should apply? and (3) Does the
law meet this level of scrutiny?343 A court begins by identifying what
classification the discriminatory law falls into. There are two types of
classifications—laws that are discriminatory on their face and laws that are
facially neutral law but create a discriminatory impact or effect.344
After identifying the appropriate classification, the court then identifies
the level of scrutiny that should be applied to the law.345 There are generally
three levels of scrutiny: Strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational
basis test.346 Strict scrutiny is typically applied to laws that discriminate on
the basis of race or national origin.347 When evaluating discriminatory laws
under strict scrutiny, the law is only upheld if the government proves that the
law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.348
Intermediate scrutiny is often applied to laws that discriminate on the basis

338
339
340
341

342
343
344
345
346
347
348

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982)).
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (“A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications
that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing
concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the
State to remedy every ill.”).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 697 (5th ed. 2015).
Id. at 698.
Id.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of gender.349 Under intermediate scrutiny, a discriminatory law is upheld if
it is substantially related to an important government purpose.350 Lastly, the
rational basis test is applied to all other laws that do not invoke a higher level
of scrutiny.351 Under the rational basis test, the discriminatory law is upheld
if it “bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.”352 In other
words, a court must determine whether the law is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.353
Finally, the court must determine whether the discriminatory law meets
the applied level of scrutiny.354 To do this, the court evaluates the
discriminatory law’s ends and its means.355 The law’s ends are evaluated
through the level of scrutiny applied.356 For strict scrutiny, the law’s end must
be deemed compelling; for intermediate scrutiny, the law’s end must be
considered important; and for the rational basis test, the law’s end must have
a legitimate purpose.357 In considering the means of the law, the court
generally focuses on the degree to which the law is overinclusive or
underinclusive.358 A law is overinclusive if it applies to people who do not
need to be included in order to meet the law’s end.359 A law is underinclusive
if it does not apply to people who are similar to those to whom the law applies
in order to meet the law’s end.360 Like when evaluating the law’s ends, the
law’s means are also evaluated through the level of scrutiny applied.361 For
strict scrutiny, a relatively close fit is required (the law’s means is not
overinclusive or underinclusive); for intermediate scrutiny, a closer fit is
required than is under a rational basis test.362
Although the Supreme Court in the Roper line of cases did not consider
whether the challenged sentences violated the Equal Protection Clause,
young adult offenders still cite those cases to argue that unequal treatment of
juveniles and young adults at sentencing violates the Equal Protection

349
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351
352
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354
355
356
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360
361
362

Id.
Id.
Id.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 342, at 699.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
Id.
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Clause.363 Young adults bringing equal protection challenges commonly
claim that young adults and juveniles are similarly situated and, therefore,
must be treated alike under the law.364 Like the Eighth Amendment
challenges, these equal protection challenges rely on new scientific evidence
to illustrate the similarities between juveniles and young adults.365
Nonetheless, courts continually reject these challenges.366
These equal protection challenges are reviewed under the rational basis
test.367 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that laws discriminating on
the basis of age are not subject to a higher level of scrutiny and must only
satisfy the rational basis test.368 As explained above, the rational basis test is
satisfied as long as there is a rational relationship between the discriminatory
law and a legitimate government purpose.369 This deferential level of
scrutiny effectively creates an insurmountable hurdle for young adults
challenging their sentences under the Equal Protection Clause.370 As a result,
courts invariably find that sentencing laws discriminating between juveniles
and young adults do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. For example,
in Adams v. Frauenheim, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California held that California’s sentencing structure, which treated young
adults differently than juveniles, satisfied the rational basis test.371 The young
adult defendant in Adams challenged a sentencing provision which allows
juveniles who received an LWOP sentence to request a resentencing after
363

364

365

366

367
368
369
370

371

See, e.g., Joint Brief for the Defendants/Appellants on Appeal from the Suffolk Cnty. Superior Ct.
at 72, 75, Commonwealth v. Watt, 146 N.E.3d 414 (Mass. 2020) (arguing that a mandatory LWOP
sentence imposed on a young adult, but not a juvenile, violates the Eighth Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause).
See, e.g., In re Jones, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (restating young adult
defendant’s argument that the sentencing law violates the Equal Protection Clause because it denies
young adults the same opportunity to petition for resentencing that is afforded to similarly situated
juvenile offenders).
See, e.g., id. at 574 (noting that young adult defendant argued that juveniles and young adults are
similarly situated because they have “developing brains, lack maturity, and have increased potential
for rehabilitation”).
See, e.g., Adams v. Frauenheim, No. 17-cv-01289-EMC, 2018 WL 3046939, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June
14, 2018) (rejecting equal protection challenge to differential treatment between juveniles and
young adults).
See, e.g., id. at *5 (stating that, when neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is implicated,
the appropriate standard of analysis is rational basis review).
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000); see also Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to age classifications).
Supra notes 352–353 and accompanying text.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 342, at 700 (“The rational basis test is enormously deferential to the
government, and only rarely have laws been declared unconstitutional for failing to meet this level
of review.”).
Adams, 2018 WL 3046939, at *6.
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serving fifteen years of incarceration.372 The California Legislature enacted
this provision in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama,
which held that mandatory LWOP sentences could not be imposed on
juveniles.373 The district court in Adams concluded that the “distinction the
California Legislature drew regarding LWOP sentences between juvenile
offenders and adult offenders (including those who just turned [eighteen]) is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in treating juvenile
offenders less harshly than adult offenders due to their immature and stilldeveloping minds.”374 Similarly, in In re Jones, the California Court of Appeal
rejected a nearly identical challenge.375 There, the court reasoned that the
sentencing provision satisfied the rational basis test because the California
Legislature could reasonably decide to distinguish juveniles from young
adults.376 Drawing a bright line at eighteen years old for sentencing purposes,
the court reasoned, is not impermissibly arbitrary.377
Courts have also denied equal protection challenges after simply
reasoning that juveniles and young adults are not similarly situated.378 In
State v. Robertson, the Minnesota Supreme Court used that exact reasoning in
order to support its holding that a young adult’s equal protection claim was
meritless.379 Specifically, the court was considering whether the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding in Miller imposed an age-based classification that
unconstitutionally distinguishes between juvenile offenders and twenty-twoyear-old offenders.380 Since the U.S. Supreme Court already held that adults
and children are constitutionally different, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reasoned that juveniles and adults are not similarly situated, and equal
protection principles do not apply.381 Courts utilizing this rationale seem to
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Id. at *3–*4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *7.
In re Jones, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 574–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 575.
Id.
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 908 N.W.2d 539, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (unpublished table decision)
(rejecting equal protection challenge on the basis that “[j]uveniles and young adults are not similarly
situated for the purposes of sentencing within this constitutional scheme”).
State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 877 (Minn. 2016). The opinion in Robertson does not explicitly
explain the reasons for the court’s holding. Instead, the court stated that it recently rejected
identical arguments in Munt v. State, 880 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2016), and that it was relying on the
reasoning expressed in Munt to support its holding. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 877; see also Munt, 880
N.W.3d at 383 (holding that the failure to extend Miller to a thirty-five-year-old offender does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 877.
Munt, 880 N.W.3d at 838.

1188

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:5

sidestep traditional equal protection analyses by establishing at the onset that
the Equal Protection Clause is inapplicable to these claims.
Accordingly, equal protection challenges to sentences imposed on young
adult will likely continue to fail. Even if courts accept that juveniles and
young adults are similarly situated in light of new scientific evidence, the
Equal Protection Clause only demands that age-based classifications satisfy
the rational basis test. This highly deferential level of scrutiny will thwart any
equal protection arguments advanced by young adults. For those reasons,
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause will not yield any meaningful
change to sentences imposed on young adults or address their diminished
criminal responsibility.
3. What This Means for Young Adults
Expecting the courts to intervene and redefine young adult culpability is
an unrealistic expectation. As the case law indicates, challenges to sentences
imposed on young adults under the Eighth Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause are widely unsuccessful. Comparatively, an Eighth
Amendment challenge is more persuasive as the courts can specifically
consider the diminished culpability of young adults while exercising their
independent judgment. However, before a court can bring its own judgment
to bear, it must first consider the national consensus on the sentencing
practice, which has proven to be an obstacle for recent claims. Furthermore,
the recent shift by the Supreme Court in establishing categorical rules against
noncapital punishments is a rather new analysis for Eighth Amendment
challenges. As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Graham and
Miller broke from the longstanding “death is different” doctrine. The
Supreme Court likely abandoned the doctrine in order to bar cruel,
noncapital sentencing practices that ignored the differences between children
and adults. Whether this new approach to Eighth Amendment challenges
will persist over time is unclear. But what is clear is the Supreme Court’s
commitment to distinguishing juveniles from adults. By re-emphasizing that
children are different, the Supreme Court conformed with conventional folk
wisdom and built on centuries of differential treatment for children.
Unlike the Supreme Court’s traditional understanding that children are
different, the criminal culpability of young adults has not been as
foundational in either our folk psychological explanations of their behavior
or our criminal jurisprudence regulating their behavior. Although new
scientific research (especially neuroscience) has revealed groundbreaking
evidence regarding the behavior of young adults, the Supreme Court will not
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redefine the relationship between young adults and criminal responsibility
unless the evidence substantiates longstanding societal beliefs or can fully
explain young adults’ antisocial behavior. The current constitutional
framework creates a “doctrinal box” for lower courts, constraining their
ability to redefine young adult criminal responsibility even if they are
persuaded by the new scientific evidence. In other words, the rational basis
test applied to equal protection challenges and the limitations to exercising
independent judgment under Eighth Amendment challenges restrict the
courts from extending certain protections to young adults. Lower courts are
effectively barred from significantly redefining the relationship between
young adults and criminal responsibility.
In the absence of judicial intervention, the most sensible approach that
would properly address the differences posed by young adults when
compared to juveniles and adults is legislatively establishing a new, separate
system. A distinct system that considers the specific needs of young adults
and emphasizes a rehabilitative approach would be a long-term solution,
which normalizes differential treatment for young adults. The young adult
court model, although relatively new, has demonstrated reductions in
recidivism for young adults and reduced costs to the community. Young
adult courts provide a tailored approach specific to young adults and can
offer a rehabilitative focus. The establishment of young adult courts is
analogous to the creation of the juvenile justice system during the early
twentieth century.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has focused on two overlapping concepts: Folk wisdom
and scientific evidence. As exemplified by the history of the treatment of
juveniles in the criminal justice system, recent advances in behavioral and
neuroscientific research have conformed with society’s long-term perception
of children. Although the Roper line of cases has certainly reshaped
sentencing in juvenile justice, the Supreme Court’s rationale relied on deeprooted and traditional understandings of juvenile behavior. Since first
invoking parens patriae in the 1800s, the role of the courts in administering
separate treatment for juveniles has been embedded in American
jurisprudence. Moreover, society’s conventional wisdom on the behavior of
children is just as well-established. Even though recent behavioral and
neuroscientific evidence has shown that young adults also have diminished
criminal responsibility compared to adults, history and constitutional
doctrine will likely prevent any meaningful response from the courts.
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Instead, a better, more comprehensive approach to addressing young adult
criminal responsibility is establishing young adult courts. Young adult courts
can provide meaningful reform to the criminal justice system and redefine
criminal responsibility for young adults in light their diminished capacity.

